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Decree \ ^
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proper procedure for remedying the unfair

result

- > -dant's intentional misrepresentation?
STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Rule 60(b)

s

Utah Rul es :>f Ci vi 1 Pi 'ocedure.
STATEMENT O F T H E CASE

On February 2 2 , 1988, Plaintiff filed a Complaint for
Divorce in the Second

luc

-

The Complaint w a s served upon Defendant

.

:

>: ^ r r h

^\ , 3 County.
. 1 9 8 8 , and

Defendant filed an Answer on March 2 2 r 1 9 8 8 , and an Amended
Answe r \)?i Ma r c h 11\» 1 '"* B8 .
ft hearing was held on October 5, 1 9 8 8 f the Honorable
Maurice R i c h a r d s , Domestic Relations Commissioner for the
Second JUCIM, id J District Coin r. or Davis County presiding.
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Both

parties, with their counsel, were present and stipulated that
the Commissioner could sit as judge pro tempore.

The parties

reached a stipulation on a majority of issues which was read
into the record.

Also, evidence was heard at this hearing, and

as part of that evidence it was indicated that Defendant
represented that he had recently changed positions with his
employer and that his future income was to be $1,500.00 per
month.

(See Transcript of Hearing, pp. 6 and 7.)

Following

the hearing, the parties finalized their Stipulation, based
upon the representations made during settlement negotiations
and the testimony at the hearing, and Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce were entered
pursuant thereto on October 19, 1988.
specifically provided, inter alia;

Finding of Fact No. 8

"This child support payment

is based upon Defendant's change of position with his company
and his proffer that his income will be $1,500.00 per month for
the foreseeable future."

(R. at 66).

Subsequent to entering into the Stipulation, and
subsequent to the entry of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law and Decree of Divorce by the Court, Plaintiff learned
that Defendant was making substantially more than $1,500.00 per
month and, in fact, had never during the pertinent time period
had income as low as $1,500.00 per month, and that Defendant
had knowingly misrepresented his employment status and future
income.
-2-

As a direct result of acquiring said information, on
December 29, 1988, some 70 days after the entry of the decree,
Plaintiff filed a Verified Motion to Set Aside the Decree,
pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, on
the grounds of fraud, misrepresentation, misconduct, or at the
very least, mistake.

(R. at 89-91).

On February 16, 1989, the Second Judicial District Court
of Davis County issued its ruling denying Plaintiff's Motion,
explaining its reasoning as follows:

"This was a stipulated

divorce [and] is not the proper procedure to obtain a child
support increase."

(R. at 99).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Fraud or mistake are grounds for setting aside a judgment
under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Defendant's representation of his income was a false
representation of a material fact, which he made knowing it was
false, or at least that he had insufficient knowledge upon
which to base such a representation.

It was made with the

intention of inducing Plaintiff to agree to the settlement and,
acting reasonably and in reliance on this representation,
Plaintiff agreed to the settlement and was thereby injured.
Defendant's conduct therefore constitutes fraud as defined in
Utah.

-3-

The fact that the divorce was stipulated is irrelevant
and, since Plaintiff seeks to set aside the entire Decree, and
not just the child support, a Motion to Set Aside Decree under
Rule 60(b) is appropriate.
ARGUMENT
I.

DEFENDANT'S INTENTIONAL MISREPRESENTATION OF HIS
INCOME EARNING CAPACITY TO THE COURT WAS CONDUCT
WHICH SHOULD HAVE RESULTED IN THE SETTING ASIDE OF
THE DIVORCE DECREE ON GROUNDS OF FRAUD,
MISREPRESENTATION, MISCONDUCT, OR MISTAKE.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b), states:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding
for the following reasons: (1) Mistake, . . . (3) fraud
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse
party. . . .
In Utah the elements that sufficiently establish fraud

1) [A] representation was made; 2) concerning a presently
existing material fact; 3) which was false; 4) which the
one making the misrepresentation either (a) knew to be
false, or (b) made recklessly knowing he had insufficient
knowledge upon which to base such representation; 5) for
the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it; 6)
that the other party acting reasonably and in ignorance of
its falsity; 7) did in fact rely upon it; 8) and was
thereby induced to act; 9) to its injury and damage.
Cheever v. Schramm, 577 P.2d 951, 954 (Utah 1978).

So long as

the fraud is sufficiently pled through these elements, it is a
proper ground for setting aside a divorce decree.

-4-

In In Re Marriage of Modnick, 33 Cal.3d 897, 191 Cal.
Rptr. 629, 663 P.2d 187 (1983), the former husband had
deposited money into a secret savings account and had not
disclosed the existence of certain property to his ex-wife
during the dissolution proceedings.

Subsequent to the ex-wife

filing a motion to set aside the judgment on the ground of
fraud, the husband entered into negotiations regarding the
division of the assets.

Consequently, the former wife ignored

any further action on the motion and allowed the final judgment
of dissolution to be entered with the court.

The former wife's

attempts to settle the dispute with her ex-husband ultimately
failed, and the former wife filed a second motion to set aside
the final judgment on the grounds of fraud.
The Court upheld this sort of extrinsic fraud as grounds
to vacate, stating:
The law is well settled that extrinsic fraud is a proper
ground for setting aside an alimony award and a property
settlement incorporated into a divorce decree. Extrinsic
fraud is a broad concept that Mtend[s] to encompass almost
any set of extrinsic circumstances which deprive a party
of a fair adversary hearing." It "usually arises when a
party . . . has been 'deliberately kept in ignorance of
the action or proceeding or in some other way [is]
fraudulently prevented from presenting his claim or
defense'. . . ."
Id. 663 P.2d at 191 (citations omitted); see also Clissold v.
Clissold, 519 P.2d 241, 242 (Utah 1974).
Likewise, in Boyce v. Boyce, 609 P.2d 928 (Utah 1980), the
court granted a hearing on the wife's motion to set the divorce
-5-

decree aside where the husband misrepresented the value of the
parties1 assets at the time of the settlement agreement and the
assets were five times the amount disclosed.
In each of these cases, there was a representation made
concerning a presently existing material fact which was false,
which the one making the misrepresentation either knew to be
false, or made recklessly, knowing he had insufficient
knowledge upon which to base such representation, for the
purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it.

The other

party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of the falsity,
relied upon it, was induced to act by it, and was injured by it.
Similarly, Defendant misrepresented his monthly income,
knowing it to be false or that he had insufficient knowledge
upon which to base that representation.

He did so with the

intent that Ms. Malm would agree to all of the terms of the
settlement.

Ms. Malm, acting reasonably and in ignorance of

the inaccuracy of that monthly figure, relied upon that
representation and agreed to the settlement.

As a result, she

suffered economic injury.
II.

PLAINTIFF'S RULE 60(B) MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DECREE
WAS THE PROPER PROCEDURE FOR REMEDYING THE UNFAIR
RESULT CAUSED BY DEFENDANT'S INTENTIONAL
MISREPRESENTATION TO THE COURT.

In denying Plaintiff's Motion, the Court apparently relied
upon the fact that this was a stipulated divorce.

While

Plaintiff recognizes that a Stipulation was entered in this
-6-

matter, the entry of a Stipulation has no effect on Plaintiff's
Motion to Set Aside under Rule 60(b).

Pursuant to the

Stipulation the Domestic Relations Commissioner heard evidence
at a hearing, and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and a Decree of Divorce.

In fact, in Finding of Fact No. 8

the Court concluded that the "child support payment is based
upon Defendant's change of position with this company and his
proffer that his income will be $lf500.00 per month for the
foreseeable future."

This was a finding entered by the Court,

not as a result of stipulation, but as a result of Defendant's
proffer.

This proffer by Defendant constituted fraud,

misrepresentation, misconduct, or at the very east, mistake.
The mere fact that a Stipulation had been entered into between
the parties has no effect on Plaintiff's Motion.
The above conclusion is further bolstered by the Utah
Supreme Court opinion of Boyce v. Boyce, 609 P.2d 928 (Utah
1980).

In Boyce, as in this case, a divorce was granted,

"based on a settlement between the parties."

_Id. at 929.

The

plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 60(b) to set aside the
decree, claiming that the defendant had been guilty of fraud,
misrepresentation or misconduct in representing his net worth.
The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court had abused its
discretion in denying plaintiff's motion to set aside.
Clearly, the fact that a Stipulation was entered into in this
matter had no effect on Plaintiff's Motion.

-7-

The second basis for the Court's ruling appears to be that
a Rule 60(b) motion is not the proper procedure.

This Court

apparently viewed Plaintiff's Motion as merely an attempt to
increase child support.

While an increase in child support is

one of the obvious results sought by Plaintiff's Motion, it is
not the only one.

Defendant's financial status not only

affected the child support amount, but permeated throughout the
Stipulation, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and
Decree.

Defendant's financial condition affected other areas,

such as distribution of real and personal property, alimony,
debts and obligations, insurance, and costs and attorney fees
considerations.

Plaintiff's Motion was to set aside the entire

Decree, not just the child support provisions.
Additionally, the conclusion that a Rule 60(b) motion is
not a proper procedure in this instance is contrary to
established law.
A liberal standard for application of Rule 60(b) in
divorce cases is justified by the doctrine of the
continuing jurisdiction that a divorce court has over its
decrees. Clearly, a court should modify a prior decree
when the interests of equity and fair dealing with the
court and the opposing party so require. Although the
trial court displayed great patience in dealing with this
case, we cannot avoid the conclusion, on the basis of the
contentions before this Court, that an injustice may have
been perpetrated by defendant's actions.
Boyce v. Boyce, 609 P.2d 928, 931-32 (Utah 1980).

Clearly, a

Rule 60(b) motion was appropriate in these circumstances.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Malm's conduct constituted fraud, misrepresentation
or, at the least, mistake, which prejudiced the interests of
Ms. Malm and deprived her of a fair settlement in their
divorce.

As such, it is grounds for granting a Motion to Set

Aside Decree under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Therefore, Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to
reverse the District Court's decision and grant Plaintiff's
Motion to Set Aside Decree. Additionally, Plaintiff requests
that she be awarded her costs and attorney's fees incurred in
this action which were necessitated by Defendant's
misrepresentations.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this j V X day of July, 1989.
NIELSEN & SENIOR

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed four copies of the
foregoing Brief of Appellant to the following:
Craig M. Peterson
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent James S. Malm
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
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United State mail, postage prepaid, this ^/cl

day of July,

1989.

. .Kbhlman
news for P l a / i n t i f f
1194p
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
issue was deemed waived and could not be
raised in a motion for new trial. Ute-Cal Land
Dev. Corp. v. Sather, 605 P.2d 1240 (Utah
1980).
Cited in National Farmers Union Property
& Cas. Co. v. Thompson, 4 Utah 2d 7, 286 P.2d
249 (1955); Holmes v. Nelson, 7 Utah 2d 435,
326 P.2d 722 (1958); Howard v. Howard, 11
Utah 2d 149, 356 P.2d 275 (1960); Nunley v.
Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc., 15 Utah 2d 126,
388 P.2d 798 (1964); Hanson v. General Bldrs.
Supply Co., 15 Utah 2d 143, 389 P.2d 61
(1964); James Mfg. Co. v. Wilson, 15 Utah 2d
210, 390 P.2d 127 (1964); Porcupine Reservoir
Co. v. Lloyd W. Keller Corp., 15 Utah 2d 318,
392 P.2d 620 (1964); Watson v. Anderson, 29
Utah 2d 36, 504 P.2d 1003 (1973); Nichols v.
State, 554 P.2d 231 (Utah 1976); Edgar v.
Wagner, 572 P.2d 405 (Utah 1977); Time Com.

Rule 60

Fin. Corp. v. Brimhall, 575 P.2d 701 (Utah
1978); Anderton v. Montgomery, 607 P.2d 828
(Utah 1980); Miller Pontiac, Inc. v. Osborne,
622 P.2d 800 (Utah 1981); Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1981);
Kohler v. Garden City, 639 P.2d 162 (Utah
1981); Pozzolan Portland Cement Co. v. Gardner, 668 P.2d 569 (Utah 1983); Nelson v.
Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983); Golden
Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730 (Utah
1985); Estate of Kay, 705 P.2d 1165 (Utah
1985); York v. Unqualified Washington
County Elected Officials, 714 P.2d 679 (Utah
1986); King v. Fereday, 739 P.2d 618 (Utah
1987); Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318
(Utah 1987); Walker v. Carlson, 740 P.2d 1372
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Schettler, 100 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Ct. App.
1989).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 58 Am. Jur. 2d New Trial
§§ 11 to 14, 29 et seq., 187 to 191.
C.J.S. — 66 CJ.S. New Trial §§ 13 et seq.,
115, 116, 122 to 127.
A.L.R. — Consent as ground of vacating
judgment, or granting new trial, in civil case,
after expiration of term or time prescribed by
statute or rules of court, 3 A.L.R.3d 1191.
Propriety and prejudicial effect of suggestion
or comments by judge as to compromise or settlement of civil case, 6 A.L.R.3d 1457.
Necessity and propriety of counter-affidavits
in opposition to motion for new trial in civil
case, 7 A.L.R.3d 1000.
Quotient verdicts, 8 A.L.R.3d 335.
Propriety and prejudicial effect of instructions in civil case as affected by the manner in
which they are written, 10 A.L.R.3d 501.
Prejudicial effect of unauthorized view by
jury in civil case of scene of accident or premises in question, 11 A.L.R.3d 918.
Propriety and prejudicial effect of reference
by counsel in civil case to result of former trial
of same case, or amount of verdict therein, 15
A.L.R.3d 1101.

Absence of judge from courtoom during trial
of civil case, 25 A.L.R.3d 637.
Juror's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of
acquaintance or relationship with attorney in
case, or with partner or associate of such attorney, as ground for new trial or mistrial, 64
A.L.R.3d 126.
Amendment, after expiration of time for filing motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion
made in due time, 69 A.L.R.3d 845.
Authority of state court to order jury trial in
civil case where jury has been waived or not
demanded by parties, 9 A.L.R.4th 1041.
Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching
verdict, or securing new trial or reversal on
appeal, 38 A.L.R.4th 1170.
Jury trial waiver as binding on later state
civil trial, 48 A.L.R.4th 747.
Court reporter's death or disability prior to
transcribing notes as grounds for reversal or
new trial, 57 A.L.R.4th 1049.
Key Numbers. — New Trial «=» 13 et seq.,
110, 116.

Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
181
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in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these
rules or by an independent action.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is patterned
after, and similar to, Rule 60, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Fee for filing motion

to set aside judgment, §§ 78-3-16.5, 78-4-24,
78-6-14; Appx. G, Code of Judicial Administration.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Appeals.
Clerical mistakes.
—Computation of damages.
—Correction after appeal.
—Date of judgment.
Void judgment.
—Estate record.
—Inherent power of courts.
—Intent of court and parties.
—Judicial error distinguished.
—Order prepared by counsel.
—Predating of new trial motion.
Default judgment.
Jurisdiction.
Other reasons.
—"Any other reason justifying relief."
Default judgment.
Impossibility of compliance with order.
Incompetent counsel.
Lack of due process.
Merits of case.
Mistake or inadvertence.
Real party in interest.
Requirements.
—Effect of set-aside judgment.
Admissions.
—Fraud.

Divorce action.
—Independent action.
Constitutionality of taxes.
Divorce decree.
Fraud or duress.
Motion distinguished.
—Invalid summons.
Amendment without notice.
—Mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable
neglect.
Default judgment.
Delayed motion for new trial.
Failure to file cost bill.
Failure to file notice of appeal.
Failure to receive notice an4_findings.
Illness.
Inconvenience.
Merits of claim.
Negligence of attorney.
No claim for relief.
Trial court's discretion;
Unemployment compensation appeal.
Workmen's compensation appeal.
—Newly discovered evidence.
Burden of proof.
Discretion not abused.
—Procedure.
Notice to parties.
—Res judicata.
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IN THE 2ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
-0O0Civil No.
43071

TAMERA KAY MALM,
Plaintiff,

HEARING
vs.
JAMES S. MALM,
Defendant.
-0O0BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 5th day of October,
1988, the above Hearing was heard before Judge Maurice
Richards, at the Davis County Courthouse, Farmington, Utah,
Room 215.

CERTIFIED
COW

SANDRA GARDINER
CSR NO.

298

INDEPENDENT REPORTING
SERVICE
Certified Shorthand Reporters

1200 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84TT!
(801) 538-2333

1

divided.

2

MR, CATHCART:

The liabilities, the plaintiff will

3

pay, as I said, for her automobile, the Sear's debt and any

4

other debts that she's incurred since separation.

5

plaintiff will pay the American First consolidation loan.

The

6 1 Is it American First?
7

MR. PETERSON:

Um-hum.

8 J

MR. CATHCART:

And the —

9
10

The signature.

signature loan and the Visa Ma —
and —

the American First
or the MasterCard debt

and each of the parties will pay their attorneys'

U I fees and costs that they have incurred in this matter.
12

Anything I've missed or

—

13

MR. PETERSON:

Retirement.

14

MR. CATHCART:

The —

counsel for the parties will

15

determine the defendant's retirement at YESCO.

16

December 31st, 1988, the defendant will pay to the

17

plaintiff three eighths of his vested interest in

18

retirement.

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. CATHCART:

21

THE COURT:

22
23

Both

The —

by

—

And alimony is waived.
I need to have you tell me how much he

earns in gross, if you will.
MR. CATHCART:

He earns right —

24

approximately 2,000 gross.

25

gross.

he earns today,

She earns approximately 972

It's anticipated that on October 17, his gross will

Sandra Gardiner• Certified Shorthand Reporter

1

go to 1500.

2

THE COURT:

Go to 1500?

3

MR. CATHCART:

Yes.

4

MR. PETERSON:

Your Honor, we'd like to have that in

5

the record that our agreement to child support is based on

6

the fact that he knows his income will be reduced and in

7

spite of that, the child support is still set at 175 a

8

month.

9

MR. CATHCART:

And we have no

10

MR. PETERSON:

And that would not change the

11

—

circumstances.
MR. CATHCART:

12

And we have no objection to that.

13

We're paying more child support as the schedule would call

14

for at $1500 per month, that includes —

15

for the benefit of his children.
THE PETERSON:

16
17

jobs, so we're

19

She is currently making $404.25

every two weeks.
MR. PETERSON:

20
21

Well, the plaintiff just changed

—

MR. CATHCART:

18

that's appropriate I

That works out to be 972 we gave in

the information.

22

MR. CATHCART:

That's what I thought, but I can't

23

find it, the chart here.

24

MR. PETERSON:

Oh, I've got it.

25

MR. CATHCART:

$910 gross income per month.
7
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RBCEiVEo OCT 1
TERRY L. CATHCART, #4809
Attorney for Plaintiff
110 West Center Street
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone:
(801) 295-2391
THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TAMERA KAY MALM,
\
1

Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF &AW

vs.
Civil No. 43071
JAMES S. MALM,
\
',

Defendant.

The above matter
day

of

October,

came on

for hearing on Wednesday,

1988, the Honorable

Relations Commissioner, presiding.
and

by

and

Defendant
Peterson,

through Terry
appeared
counsel

Commissioner

Judge Douglas L Cornaby

could

in

L.

person

and
The

as Judge

Domestic

Plaintiff appeared in person

Cathcart,

of record.
sit

Maurice Richards,

the 5th

counsel

by

and

parties

of

record.

through
stipulated

Pro Tempore, and

The

Craig

M.

that

the _

the- parties'

Stipulation for settlement was duly entered.
The Court heard evidence in support of Plaintiff's Complaint
for divorce, and now being fully advised in the premises and for
good cause appearing, makes and enters the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1.

JURISDICTION:

This

court

has

jurisdiction

over

the

parties and the subject matter as a result of the following facts
and circumstances:

A.

RESIDENCY:

Plaintiff is now a bona fide resident

of Davis County, State of Utah, and has been such for a period in
excess of three months immediately preceding the commencement of
this action.*
B.

MARRIAGE STATISTICS:

Plaintiff and Defendant are

wife and husband, having been married at Layton, (Davis County),
Utah, on the 17th day of September, 1982.
2.

CUSTODY:

Plaintiff

is a fit and proper parent and

should be awarded the care, custody and control of the only minor
children born as issue of this marriage, or expected as a result
of this marriage, to-wit:
JAMIE LYN
KIMBERLY ANN

3.

VISITATION:

d.o.b.
d.o.b.

1/14/84
10/31/86

Defendant

weekly visitation with the parties
scheduled

should
1

be awarded

reasonable

minor children, at regularly

times and on regularly scheduled days, or subject to

reasonable advance notification to Plaintiff of not less than 48
hours when such visitation would be at other than those regularly
scheduled days and times.

Such visitation should be ordered to

include the first and third weekends of each month, commencing at
5:00 o'clock p.m. on Friday and terminating at 5:00 o'clock p.m.
on Sunday.

In addition, Defendant should be awarded the follow-

ing periods of visitation:
A.

Every Father's Day and Defendant's Birthday plus

federal and state holidays normally celebrated within the State
of Utah which

fall on the Friday before or the Monday after

Defendant's regular weekend visitation, with pickup and return
times adjusted by 24 hours from the weekend hours, as required;
and
B.

Alternating Thanksgiving and Easter/Spring vacation

periods from school at the then location of the parties' minor
children.

Such visitation should be ordered to alternate in such

a manner that the Plaintiff has custody of the children during
the Spring vacation period on all odd-numbered years and Thanks-

2

giving on even-numbered

years, while Defendant exercises said

custodial visitation during the Spring vacation on even-numbered
years and Thanksgiving on odd-numbered years; and
C.

From noon on Christmas Day until 8:30 p.m. December

27th; and
D.

When

Defendant's normal

visitation

falls upon

Mother's Day or Plaintiff's birthday, then Defendant's visitation
for those days should be forfeited; and
E.

For a period of not less than TWO nor more than

FOUR weeks during the summer, to be arranged
Defendant's vacation from his employment.

commensurate with

Additionally, should

Defendant not have available four weeks of vacation during that
summer period, then Defendant may also exercise visitation with
the children for one other week during that period, that week to
be arranged between Plaintiff and Defendant; and
F.
with

the

During periods of Defendant's extended visitation

children,

Plaintiff

should

be awarded

reciprocal

visitation on the second and fourth weekends for the same times
that Defendant would normally have the children on the first and
third weekends, unless Defendant is out of town with the children
on vacation, in which case that visitation should be ordered rescheduled

to a mutually

convenient

time.

Similarly, during

Plaintiff's extended summer vacation from her employment, if she
is out of town on vacation with the children, then Defendant's
visitation during that time frame should be ordered rescheduled
to a mutually convenient time; and
G.

All visitation provided by this paragraph should be

ordered to avoid interference with the children's normal school
schedules,
additional

and

no

adjustment

should

be

provided

to give

days as a result of school commitments falling on

those visitation days; and
H.

At any time that Plaintiff and the minor children

are out of state on vacation for a period in excess of one week,
then Defendant

should

be awarded

3

the option of visiting said

children for up to two daytime visits per week at the location of
said vacation; and
I.

The children should be allowed to call the non-

custodial" "rent a reasonable^ m:::.c.. of times per „. wee'.:, \l<h
parent

receiving

calls paying

the appropriate

the

long distance

charges, if applicable; and
J.
Plaintiff's
times

for

In the event that Defendant

does not arrive*at

home within 15 minutes of these scheduled pick-up

the commencement of any visitation provided herein,

then such visitation should be deemed forfeited and Plaintiff not
required to forestall other plans which she might have for that
time frame.
4.

REAL PROPERTY:

The real property owned by the parties

and located at 1940 South Main, Clearfield, Utah

84015, should

be ordered to be sold and any equity from that sale to be divided
equally between the parties.

Should that sale not be possible,

and a foreclosure on the property results, then any liability
from

the

foreclosure on the property should be ordered to be

divided equally between the parties.
5.

PERSONAL

PROPERTY:

In consideration

of

the debt

allocation, alimony, child support and other provisions of this
action, the personal property of the marriage should be awarded
as between the parties on the following basis:
A.

PLAINTIFF

should

be awarded

as her sole and

separate property the following items:
(1)

All

items

of

her

personal

1982

Chevrolet

clothing

and

effects;
(2)

The

Cavalier

and

associated debt;
(3)

The console stereo;

(4)

The stereo components and large speakers;

(5)

The dining room set;

(6)

The lawn mower;

(7)

The refrigerator;
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its

B.

(8)

The washer and dryer; and

(9)

The Amway business kit.

DEFENDANT

should

be awarded

as his

sole

and

clothing

and

perorate property the f^ilc.ing items:
(1)

All

items

of

his

personal

effects;
(2)

The 1979 Jcc^TCJ 5; and

(3)

All

of

the

remaining

furniture

in

the

parties1 residence.
C.

All other personal property has been previously

allocated between the parties, and ownership of such should be
confirmed

in that party having possession as of the date of the

default hearing in this action.
D.

Additionally, Defendant should be ordered to repair

and return Plaintiff's VCR to working condition.
6.

MILITARY RETIREMENT:

percentage

of Defendant's

Plaintiff should be awarded a

military

retirement based upon the

following formula:
(H) x (y/A) x (B) = Plaintiff's share (monthly)
WHERE "A" is the total of Defendant's years'
service prior to his retirement from military
service, and
WHERE " B" is the net amount of Defendant's
retirement pay after the payment of state and
federal taxes generated by the addition of this
pay to his total income, with payments made to
Plaintiff directly by Air Force Accounting and
Finance Center each month as provided by the
Uniform Services Former Spouses' Protection Act
(Public Law 97-252).
WHERE "y" is the number of years of
service accrued during the marriage,
7.
his

RETIREMENT:

military

Defendant will acquire an evaluation of

retirement benefits from his civilian employment

and

their

present value and make a cash settlement payment to Plaintiff of
her one-half interest in the retirement that has accrued during
the marriage..

Until

such

time as

5

the final Decree

in this

matter

is entered

and such retirement benefits are allocated,

Defendant should be enjoined from removing funds from the program
or from borrowing against his interest therein.
8.

CHIL^*C n t > n ORT:
1 1

I.

-II.

I

On the 'ba^f's^'cf Defendant's present

. ••

.

income and Plaintiff's

limited

»

.

.y±.

•-..•

earning power, and further in

consideration of the other aspects of the property settlement,
debt>••?*•! locat ion and

insu,r>rre provisions

con t^'r^cd^ herein,

Defendant should be ordered to pay to Plaintiff as and for child
support during the minority of the parties' children and through
high school graduation, the sum of $175.00 per month per child
for a total of $350,00 per month, payable in equal installments
on the Fifth and Twentieth days of each month thereafter.
child

support

payment

is based

upon Defendant's

This

change of

position with his company and his proffer that his income will be
$1,500.00 per month for the foreseeable future.
9.

ALIMONY:

In consideration of the property distri-

bution, debt allocation,

insurance, child support and other

provisions in this action, and the parties1 agreements to waive
claims therefore, no alimony should be awarded to either party.
10.

DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS:

As a material consideration for

the child support, alimony, property distribution, insurance and
other

provisions of this action, and the relative incomes and

present

earning powers of

the parties, each party should be

awarded the following debts and obligations of the marriage and
ordered

to hold harmless and defend the other from any claims

arising out of said obligations:
A.

PLAINTIFF should be awarded the following debts and

obligations:
(1)

Those

debts

and obligations

incurred

by

Plaintiff since the separation of the parties;
(2)

The debt associated with the 1982 Chevrolet

Cavalier

in an approximate amount of $4,600.00;

and
(3)

The

Sears credit

amount of $450.00.
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card

in an

approximate

B.

DEFENDANT should be awarded the following debts and

obligations:
(1)

Those

debts

and

obligations

incurred

by

Defendant singe^thc; ^ccparation of the^ar^ics;
(2)

The debt arising out of any mortgage on the

parties1 residence;
(3)

All utilities, costs, etc.,: "related to the

parties1 residence;
(4)

The America First Credit Union Line of Credit

loan in an approximate amount of $1,030.00;
(5)

The America First Credit Union consolidation

loan in an approximate amount of $3,100.00; and
(6)

The Citibank

Mastercard

in an approximate

amount of $1,400.00.
11.

INCOME TAX

RETURN:

Each of the parties should be

ordered to prepare separate State and Federal Income Tax returns
for income earned during calendar year 1988.
12.

INCOME TAX DEDUCTIONS:

For purposes of filing State

and Federal income tax returns, Plaintiff should be awarded the
dependency
children.

deduction arising

from the younger of the parties'

Defendant should be awarded the dependency deduction

arising from the older of the parties1 children.

Additionally,

Plaintiff should be ordered to file for social security numbers
for

the minor

However,

all

children

to be used on the income tax returns.

deductions

awarded

to

Defendant

should

be

conditioned upon his being current in all child support payments
for the year in question as of December 31st of that tax year and
should revert to Plaintiff automatically without requirement for
notice should that condition not be met.'
13.

HEALTH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE:

Defendant should be

ordered to provide health, accident and dental insurance for the
benefit of the parties' minor children, with deductible amounts
and

coverage equal to or better than those in existence as of

February
through

l, 1988, for so long as group coverage is available
his

current

or any subsequent

7

place

of

employment.

Further, Defendant should be ordered to pay for one-half of any
deductible

amounts

for such

medical

or dental

services

or

prescriptions related thereto that are not paid by his insurance
co^er*>^ and to provide ..P7^'irti ff with executed ^cl'z irr* forms and
other assistance necessary to insure the prompt payment of all
such claims.

Plaintiff

should

health, accident and dental

also be ordered

to maintain

insurance for' the benefit of the

minor children so long as such coverage is available through her
employment at a reasonable cost.

Any non covered items should be

ordered to be divided equally between the parties.
14.

LIFE

INSURANCE:

Defendant

should

be ordered

to

continue in full force and effect life insurance policies in a
minimum

amount of $60,000 unencumbered value, and to pay any

premiums arising out of said coverage until the minor children
reach age 21 or complete their formal education, with the minor
children being named as beneficiaries under those policies.
15.

GROUNDS:

During the course of the marriage the parties

have become unable to resolve or reconcile their differences,
these

irreconcilable

differences

leading

to the

complete

breakdown of the marriage relationship.
16.

COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES:

In consideration of the

support, alimony and property distribution provisions contained
herein, and the relative earning power of the parties, each of
the parties should be ordered to pay their own attorney's fees
and costs.
17.
78-45d-2

ORDER TO WITHHOLD AND DELIVER:
and

Pursuant to Sections

30-3-5.1 of the Utah Code Annotated

(1953, as

amended) an Order to Withhold and Deliver child support payments
should

be prepared

thereby
child

and maintained

in the file of this action

requiring Defendant's employer to withhold and deliver

support

payments as awarded

by

this

court, with

the

provision that such order will not be acted upon until such time
as an appropriate affidavit is filed by Plaintiff alleging that
Defendant is delinquent in payment of support as ordered by the
court.
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18.

SIGN ALL PAPERS:

Each of the parties should be ordered

to sign all papers, documents, titles, deeds, etc., necessary to
effectuate

the. transfer of real and personal property by and

between the parties
From

- herein set forth.

the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, the Court makes and

enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A.

DIVORCE GRANTED:

of Divorce

from

Plaintiff should be awarded a Decree

Defendant, thereby dissolving

the bonds of

matrimony presently existing between the parties.

Such Decree

should become final on entry upon the records of the Court.
B.

CUSTODY, SUPPORT, ALIMONY AND VISITATION:

of and visitation with the parties

1

The custody

minor children, the child

support, and the alimony should be ordered in accordemce with the
Findings herein.
C.
and

DEBTS AND PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION:

child

support

In making the alimony

findings above, the Court

has taken

into

account the allocation of debts, the distribution of property,
and

the insurance provisions contained herein; each such item

should be ordered in accordance with those Findings.
D.

MISCELLANEOUS:

The costs and attorney's fees, life

insurance, health insurance and other miscellaneous provisions
should be ordered in accordance with the Findings herein.
E.

WITHHOLDING ORDER:

An Order to Withhold and Deliver

child support payments should be entered in accordance with the
appropriate statutes, and retained

in the file for use if and

when necessary.
DATED this

day of October, 1988.

MAURICE RICHARDS,
District Judge Pro Tempore
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APPROVEI

TO FORM:

'IG M/ PETERSON,
Attorney for Defendant

10

ft <fLo
TERRY L. CATHCART, #4809
Attorney for Plaintiff
110 West Center Street
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone: (801) 295-2391
THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
TAMERA KAY MALM,
Plaintiff,

)
)
J

Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)

vs.
JAMES S. MALM,

DECREE OF DIVORCE
'
Civil No, 43071
Judge Douglas L Cornaby

The above matter came on for hearing on Wednesday, the 5th
day of October, 1988, the Honorable Maurice Richards, Domestic
Relations Commissioner, presiding.

Plaintiff appeared in person

and by and through Terry L. Cathcart, counsel of record.
Defendant

appeared

in person

Peterson, counsel of record.
Commissioner

and by and

through

The parties stipulated

Craig

The
M.

that the

could sit as Judge Pro Tempore, and the" parties1

Stipulation for settlement was duly entered.
The

Court

heard

evidence

in support

of

Plaintiff's

COMPLAINT for divorce, and having previously entered the FINDINGS
OF FACT and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, and now being fully advised in
the premises, makes and enters the? fbllowing:
DECREE OF DIVORCE
1.
of

DIVORCE GRANTED:

Divorce

matrimony

from

Plaintiff is hereby granted a Decree

Defendant,

thereby

severing

heretofore existing between the parties.

the

bonds of

Said Decree

to become final upon entry in the official records of the clerk
of Davis County, State of Utah, automatically and without further
action by the parties.
2.

CUSTODY:

Plaintiff is a fit and proper parent and is

awarded the care, custody and control of the only minor children
born as issue of this marriage, or expected as a result of this
marriage, to-wit:
JAMIE LYN
KIMBERLY ANN

3.

VISITATION:

visitation
scheduled

with

d.o.b.
d.o.b,

1/14/84
10/31/86

Defendant

the parties

1

is awarded
minor

reasonable weekly

children,

at

regularly

times and on regularly scheduled days, or subject to

reasonable advance notification to Plaintiff of not less than 48
hours when such visitation would be at other than those regularly
scheduled days and times.

Such visitation is ordered to include

the first and third weekends of each month, commencing at 5:00
o'clock p.m. on Friday and terminating at 5:00 o'clock p.m. on
Sunday.

In addition, Defendant is awarded the following periods

of visitation:
A.

Every Father's Day and Defendant's Birthday plus

federal and state holidays normally celebrated within the State
of Utah which
Defendant's

fall

on the Friday

before or the Monday after

regular weekend visitation, with pickup and return

times adjusted by 24 hours from the weekend hours, as required;
and
B.

Alternating Thanksgiving and Easter/Spring vacation

periods from school at the then location of the parties' minor
children.

Such visitation is ordered

to alternate, JLn such a

manner that the Plaintiff has custody of the children during the
Spring

vacation period

giving

on even-numbered

on all

odd-numbered

years and Thanks-

years, while Defendant exercises said

custodial visitation during the Spring vacation on even-numbered
years and Thanksgiving on odd-numbered years; and

2

C.

From noon on Christmas Day until 8:30 p.m. December

27th; and
D.

When

Defendant's

normal

visitation

falls upon

Mother's Day or Plaintiff's birthday, then Defendant's visitation
for those days is forfeited; and
E.

For a period of not

FOUR weeks during

the summer,

less than TWO nor more than

to be arranged commensurate with

Defendant's vacation from his employment.

Additionally, should

Defendant not have available four weeks of vacation during that
summer period, then Defendant may also exercise visitation with
the children for one other week during that period, that week to
be arranged between Plaintiff and Defendant; and
F.

During periods of Defendant's extended visitation

with the children, Plaintiff is awarded reciprocal visitation on
the second and fourth weekends for the same times that Defendant
would normally have the children on the first and third weekends,
unless Defendant is out of town with the children on vacation, in
which case that visitation is ordered rescheduled to a mutually
convenient

time.

Similarly, during Plaintiff's extended summer

vacation from her employment, if she is out of town on vacation
with the children, then Defendant's visitation during that time
frame is ordered rescheduled to a mutually convenient time; and
G.

All

visitation

provided

by

this paragraph

is

ordered to avoid interference with the children's normal school
schedules, and no adjustment is provided to give additional days
as a result

of school commitments

falling on those visitation

days; and
H.

At any time that Plaintiff and the minor children

are out of state on vacation for a period in excess, of one week,
then Defendant

is awarded*the option of visiting^aid

children

for up to two daytime visits per week at the location of said
vacation; and
I.
parent

The children are allowed to call the non-custodial

a reasonable number of times per week, with the parent

3

receiving calls paying the appropriate long distance charges, if
applicable; and
J.

In the event

Plaintiff's home within
times
then

does not arrive at

15 minutes of these scheduled pick-up

for the commencement
such visitation

that Defendant

of any visitation provided herein,

is deemed

forfeited

and Plaintiff

not

required to forestall other plans which she might have for that
time frame,
4.
and

REAL PROPERTY:

located

at

The real property owned by the parties

1940 South Main, Clearfield, Utah

84015, is

ordered to be sold and any equity from that sale to be divided
equally between the parties.

Should that sale not be possible,

and a foreclosure on the property results, then any liability
from

the foreclosure on the property is ordered

to be divided

equally between the parties.
5.

PERSONAL

PROPERTY:

In consideration

of

the debt

allocation, alimony, child support and other provisions of this
action,

the personal

property

of the marriage

is awarded as

between the parties on the following basis:
A.

PLAINTIFF

is awarded

as her sole and

separate

property the following items:
(1)

All

items

of

her

personal

clothing

and

C a v a l i e r ^and

its

effects;
(2)

The

1982

Chevrolet

associated debt;

B.

(3)

The console stereo;

(4)

The stereo components and large speakers;

(5)

The dining room set;

(6)

The lawn mower;

(7)

The refrigerator;

(8)

The washer and dryer; and

(9)

The Amway business kit.

DEFENDANT

is awarded

property the following items:

4

as his sole and

separate

(1)

All

items

of

his

personal

clothing

and

effects;
(2)

The 1979 Jeep CJ 5; and

(3)

All

parties
C.
allocated
confirmed

1

the

remaining

furniture

in the

residence.

All other

between

of

the

personal property has been previously
parties,

and

ownership

of such

is

in that party having possession as of the date of the

default hearing in this action.
D.

Additionally, Defendant

is ordered

to repair and

return Plaintiff's VCR to working condition.
6.

MILITARY RETIREMENT:

of Defendant's

military

Plaintiff is awarded a percentage

retirement

based upon

the

following

formula:
(H) x (y/A) x (B) = Plaintiff's share (monthly)
WHERE "A" is the total of Defendant's years'
service prior to his retirement from military
service, and
WHERE "B" is the net amount of Defendant's
retirement pay after the payment of state and
federal taxes generated by the addition of this
pay to his total income, with payments made to
Plaintiff directly by Air Force Accounting and
Finance Center each month as provided by the
Uniform Services Former Spouses' Protection Act
(Public Law 97-252).
WHERE f,y" is the number of years of
service accrued during the marriage.
7.

RETIREMENT:

military

Defendant" will acquire an evaluation of

his retirement benefits

from his civilian employment

and their

present value and make a cash settlement payment to Plaintiff of
her one-half
the marriage.

interest

in the retirement that has accrued during

Until such time as the final Decree in this matter

is entered and such retirement benefits are allocated, Defendant
is

enjoined

from

removing

funds

from

borrowing against his interest therein.
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the program

or

from

8.

CHILD SUPPORT:

Defendant is ordered to pay to Plaintiff

as and for child support the sum of $175.00 per month per child
for

a total

sum

of

$350.00

per

month,

payable

in

equal

installments on the Fifth and Twentieth days of each month.
9.

ALIMONY:

bution, debt

In consideration

allocation,

of the property distri-

insurance, child

support and other

provisions in this action, and the parties^ agreements to waive
claims therefore, no alimony is awarded to either party.
10.

DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS:

As a material consideration for

the child support, alimony, property distribution, insurance and
other provisions of this action, and the relative incomes and
present earning powers of the parties, each party is awarded the
following debts and obligations of the marriage and

ordered to

hold harmless and defend the other from any claims arising out of
said obligations:
A.

PLAINTIFF

is awarded

the

following

debts

and

obligations:
(1)

Those

debts

and

obligations

incurred

by

Plaintiff since the separation of the parties;
(2)

The debt associated with the 1982 Chevrolet

Cavalier

in an approximate amount of $4,600.00;

and
(3)

The

Sears

credit

card

in an

approximate

amount of $450.00.
B.

DEFENDANT

is awarded

the

following

debts

and

obligations:
(1)

Those

debts

and

obligations

incurred

by

Defendant since the separation of the parties;
(2)

The debt arising out of any mortgage on the

parties1 residence;
(3)

All utilities, costs, etc., related to the

parties1 residence;
(4)

The America First Credit Union Line of Credit

loan in an approximate amount of $1,030.00;
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(5)

The America First Credit Union consolidation

loan in an approximate amount of $3,100.00; and
(6)

The Citibank

Mastercard

in an approximate

amount of $1,400.00.
11.

INCOME TAX RETURN:

Each of the parties is ordered to

prepare separate State and Federal Income Tax returns for income
earned during calendar year 1988.
12.
and

INCOME TAX DEDUCTIONS:

Federal

dependency

income

tax

For purposes of filing State

returns,

deduction arising

Plaintiff

is awarded

the

from the younger of the parties1

children.

Defendant is awarded the dependency deduction arising

from

older

the

of

the

parties'

children.

Additionally,

Plaintiff is ordered to file for social security numbers for the
minor children to be used on the income tax returns.
all deductions
being

current

awarded

to Defendant

in all child

support

However,

are conditioned upon his
payments

for the year in

question as of December 31st of that tax year and should revert
to Plaintiff automatically without requirement for notice should
that condition not be met.
13.

HEALTH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE:

Defendant is ordered to

provide health, accident and dental insurance for the benefit of
the parties1 minor children, with deductible amounts and coverage
equal

to or better

1988,

for so

than those in existence as of February 1,

long as group coverage is available through his

current or any subsequent place of employment.

Further, Defen-

dant is ordered to pay for one-half of any deductible amounts for
such medical or dental services or prescriptions related thereto
that are not paid by his insurance coverage and to provide Plaintiff with executed claim forms and other assistance necessary to
insure the prompt payment of all such claims.

plaintiff should^

also be ordered to maintain health, accident and dental insurance
for the benefit of the minor children so long as such coverage is
available through her employment at a reasonable cost.
covered

items

is ordered

to be divided

parties.
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Any non

equally between

the

14.

LIFE INSURANCE:

Defendant is ordered to continue in

full force and effect life insurance policies in a minimum amount
of $60,000 unencumbered value, and to pay any premiums arising
out of said coverage until the minor children reach age 21 or
complete their formal education, with the minor children being
named as beneficiaries under those policies.
15.

COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES:

Ii^ consideration of the

support, alimony and property distribution provisions contained
herein, and the relative earning power of the parties, each of
the parties

is ordered

to pay

their own attorneyfs fees and

costs.
16.

ORDER TO WITHHOLD AND DELIVER:

78-45d-2 and

30-3-5.1

Pursuant to Sections

of the Utah Code Annotated

(*1953, as

amended) an Order to Withhold and Deliver child support payments
will

be prepared and maintained

thereby
child

in the file of

this action

requiring Defendant's employer to withhold and deliver

support

payments

as awarded

by

this court, with

the

provision that such order will not be acted upon until such time
as an appropriate affidavit is filed by Plaintiff alleging that
Defendant is delinquent in payment of support as ordered by the
court.
17.
sign

SIGN ALL PAPERS:

all papers,

effectuate

documents,

Each of the parties is ordered to
titles, deeds, etc., necessary

the transfer of real and personal property by and

between the parties as herein set forth.
DATED this

\°\+U day of October, 1988.

-

i^

MAURICE RICHARDS,
District Judge Pro Tempore
APPROVED AS TO FORMj^-

~^^

jettAIG/M. PETERSON^
A t t o / n e y f o r Defendant

/

to

8

Jay R. Mohlman (5113)
NIELSEN & SENIOR
Attorneys for Plaintiff
1100 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1900

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
TAMERA KAY MALM,
Plaintiff,

vs.
JAMES S. MALM,
Defendant.

]
)
1

VERIFIED MOTION TO
SET ASIDE DECREE

'

Civil No. 43071

i

Judge Douglas L. Cornaby

]

Plaintiff moves the Court pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for an order setting aside the
Decree of Divorce that has been entered in this matter.

This

motion is based on the following:
1.

This action was initiated on or about February 22 f

1988 by the filing of a complaint by Plaintiff.
2.

After service of said complaint on March 2, 1988 an

answer was filed on March 22, 1988 and an amended answer was filed
on or about March 30, 1988.
3.

A hearing was held on October 5, 1988, the Honorable

Maurice Richards, Domestic Relations Commissioner, presiding.

Both parties, with their counsel, were present.

The parties

stipulated that the Commissioner could sit as judge pro tempore.
Evidence was heard at the hearing, the parties stipulated and
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce
was entered pursuant thereto.

At that hearing, it was represented

by Defendant that he had recently changed positions with his
employer and he expressly represented that his income was to be
$1,500.00 per month.
4.

The express representation by Defendant of the

amount of his income in his new position was false, it was false
at the time it was made, and Defendant knowingly made the false
representation for the purpose of causing Plaintiff to rely upon
it and to result in Plaintiff's agreement to accept a lesser
amount of child support than she would otherwise have accepted.
Defendant's conduct amounts to fraud upon Plaintiff and upon the
court.

Alternatively, the representation of Defendant constitutes

a mistake sufficient to have the decree set aside under Rule
60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
DATED this 2 ^ day of December, 1988.
NIELSEN & SENIOR

Mohlman /
eys for Plaintiff

-2-

VERIFICATION
I, Tamera Kay Malm, the Plaintiff in the above-entitled
action, have read the foregoing Motion to Set Aside Decree and
verify that its contents are true and correct to the best of my
knowledge.
DATED this J?T

day of December, 1988.

Tamera Kay Malm
STATE OF UTAH

)

ss.

:
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)

Subscribed and sworn to before me this s?$~December, 1988.

My Commission expires:

day of

Rotary Public
Residing at:

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this 234^ day of December, 1988,
I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Verified Motion
to Set Aside Decree by United States mails, postage prepaid,
addressed as follows:
Craig M. Peterson, Esq.
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorney for Defendant.

58741

In the Second Judicial District Court
in and for the

County of Davis, State of Utah
TAMERA -R7CY MALM,

Plaintiff,
vs.
JAMES S. MALM,
Defendant.

)

RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO SET ASIDE
DECREE

)

Civil No. 43071

)

)

The plaintiff's motion to set aside the decree came before
the court pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial
Administration with Jay R. Mohlman for the plaintiff and Craig M.
Peterson for the defendant*
The plaintiff's motion to set aside the decree is denied.
This was a stipulated divorce. This is not the proper procedure
to obtain a child support increase.
Dated Februai^ 16, 1989.
BY THE COURT:

2<* ^

Certificate of Mailing:
/
This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing TfcviYiVkg /to 3^y 9.. ttoKLraact, 110Q
Beneficial Life Tower, 36 South State Street, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84111 and Craig M. Peterson, 426 South 500 East, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84102 on February 16, 1989.

